

**A Comparative Analysis of
UNMIS, UNAMIR and UNAMSIL:
including recommendations for improvements on the UNMIS
mission**

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Introduction

Civil war has continued in Darfur, without any hope for security, safety and well-being and whether one accepts that it as a failed state or maintains optimism that the current UN Mission in Darfur can lift the region out of its current chaotic situation may very well depend on what the presence and success of the UN peacekeepers is contingent upon. A look at peacekeeping historically along with a critical look at past and current analysis of UN missions in other parts of the world suggests that the effectiveness of a mission often lies not in the efforts made but really on whether a gamble has been taken rather than a considerable coordinated regional and external approach. It appears that a gamble has been taken in Darfur. In taking less of a gamble, the approach would imply looking at the single most important event or condition that will stabilize the situation or reverse the destruction and strife and changing course.

In other words, does one set of circumstances have to occur before another phase can be entered in providing for the well being of a population in a war torn community or is there a holistic approach that doesn't wait for local progress but considers contingencies and has strong alternatives in place? It is therefore important to take a brief look at how UN peacekeeping missions had been envisioned and then compare the mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), specifically as it relates to Darfur, to two missions, one that did not provide good results - Rwanda (UNAMIR) - and one that did - Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

UN Peacekeeping

Although the UN Charter in Article 43 had envisioned that each Member State would enter into an agreement with the UN to provide a permanent national force for use when needed, it was a voluntary force that became the practice for the Security Council. The term peacekeeping came about in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis. The ad hoc nature of peacekeeping has many times seemed reactive to crisis and had until 1956 relegated any UN efforts to unarmed observers. During the Suez Canal crisis, Canada's

foreign minister Lester Bowles Pearson, who won the Nobel Prize for his innovative concept, helped create chapter six and a half of the Charter, as it has been popularly termed. This concept lies somewhere between Chapter VI (peaceful dialogue and mediation) and Chapter VII (use of force). It is one part of classic peacekeeping and the idea is that observers and a cease-fire aren't enough in a conflict. Krasno notes that according to Pearson, he required a "peace and police force that will really police the border and have the physical power to do it." (p. 230). The other part of classic peacekeeping comes from Hammarskjold's principles that include: (1) peacekeeping forces could only be deployed after a cease-fire; (2) the consent of the host country; (3) UN troops could only fire in self-defense; and (4) the UN had to remain impartial. (p. 231)

According to Bowles, this was followed with the work of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, and his Agenda for Peace. His policy was defined to include more preventative measures, including: (1) more diplomatic missions by the Secretary-General and his representatives; (2) doing more to inspire trust and confidence between contenders; (3) better early warning of impending conflict; and (4) peace building and mending societies damaged by war. (p. 7) After the UN Mission to Rwanda, amendments were added to clearly separate peacekeeping from peace enforcement and allow for more enforcement and addressed that warring parties don't want to make peace. Kofi Annan's optimistic prioritization of 'talk first' and persuasion, then economic pressure and as a last resort intervention by force cannot go unmentioned. (p. 21) With the task of establishing and building peace, an analysis of UN missions can illustrate that often the best practices have been from missions with two-tracked diplomatic and force strategies that were not contingent on local progress in sequence, but on increased strength of peacekeeping troops. This allowed the peacekeepers to get closer to peace building efforts while placing a strong emphasis from the start on disarmament in return for more participation by addressing the scope of the conflict among parties.

UNMIS - Current Situation of UN Mission

According to the background provided by UNMIS, the Sudan has had civil conflicts for most of the years since its independence in 1956. UNAMIS was established in resolution 1547 in June 2004 as a special political mission to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged peace support operation. In response to the situation in Darfur specifically, the Security Council assigned additional tasks to UNAMIS in resolution 1556. This resolution expressed concern for the lack of disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, the lack of justice being served of the leaders responsible for the human rights violations and asked for more human rights monitors.

However, this resolution seems to neglect to acknowledge that the efforts toward a peace agreement, which the African Union set up in May 2006, namely the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), were uncoordinated and splintered the region even more, into signatories and non-signatories. The agreement made arrangements on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, ceasefire and security arrangements and opened dialogue. All parties were present, and only the government and the SLM/A led by Minni Minawi signed. Non-signatories include the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Abdelwahid faction of the SLM/A and the agreement was not supported by the internally displaced persons affected by the conflict.

In response, a group formed called the National Redemption Front (NRF) that opposed the DPA and demanded adjustments. Fighting escalated directly as a response to the DPA. Implementing the agreement became close to impossible as fear of worsened conditions set in. While one of the principles for UN peacekeeping missions is a ceasefire, it is critical to note that the UN entered conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia without a ceasefire in place, when it became immoral to remain impartial in the face of genocide and brutal disregard for human life.

It is important to note that resolution 1590 that supported the CPA - the peace agreement between the North and South Sudan - showed that the UN was working with the AU and although there were discussions between the Secretary General and the Sudanese government about spoilers to the peace process in terms of the CPA. However

the discussions did not focus on decreasing tensions by providing a model for inclusiveness in the region, like the one in Sierra Leone. In terms of the DPA, the government, the AU or the UN did not consider the implications of such widespread opposition nor were they analyzed prior to the AU's introduction of the peace process. Similarly, the lack of a firm plan of action that would prevent any further warring by opponents to the peace agreement shows the narrowness of the UN mandates. The situation in Rwanda suffered from a similar narrowness in scope, risk aversion and did not have an analysis in place about the implications of opposition to the plan.

The most recent resolution that has extended the mandate of UNMIS, resolution 1755 extends the mission in Darfur until October 31, 2007. Evelyn Leopold in a Reuters article states, "But the United States, which drafted the resolution, was forced to water down the text on Darfur and delete calls for a large U.N. force in the western Sudanese region. The United States had wanted only a three-month extension, mainly to keep pressure on Sudan to approve a large "hybrid" United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur." This appears to be similar in nature to General Dallaire's call for additional troops in Rwanda.

Although resolution 1755 tries to emphasize the importance of the peace process, it remains focused on the peace agreements and does not increase the number of peacekeeping troops, repeating the mistakes of Rwanda. Additionally, the lack of a new special representative for UNMIS, which has been without a chief of mission since Khartoum expelled Jan Pronk last October, is not helpful. Although the resolution "calls upon those parties that have not signed the Darfur Peace Agreement to do so without delay and not to act in any way that would impede the implementation of the Agreement" (Res. 1755), it does not have an enforcement mechanism. Once again, this shows that the mission is contingent upon the local progress of the peace agreement that the AU proposed, rather than being contingent on actively strengthening the peace process.

The influence of the Khartoum government and the risk aversion of the Security Council is glaring. Although the UN chief, Ban Ki-Moon, said President al-Bashir has agreed to UN logistical and financial assistance for African Union troops in Darfur, Sudan has always resisted the deployment of a UN force. Recently, as reported in an

article in Al Jazeera, in a speech given to meeting regional leaders at the Arab League summit in Riyadh, al-Bashir criticized UN resolutions calling UN troop deployment in Darfur as a violation of Sudan's sovereignty and said they "provoke the conflict in Darfur, instead of finding a solution for it".

This poorly affects the peace-efforts in Darfur, since without compliance of the national government, it is unlikely that any measures locally can receive the inclusiveness that would allow for what seems to be the central goal of the resolutions: the compliance to the peace agreement

UNMIS - The Main Problems

In reviewing the policies being used in addressing the situation in Darfur, the significant problems that UNMIS faces are: (1) there was little work to build support for the peace agreement prior to its signature and there was little attention given to examining the implications of not having all parties involved in the conflict adhere to the peace agreement; (2) no model of good governance was put into place to immediately have the local governor and government adopt an inclusive relationship with the local leaders toward power-sharing (politically and economically) in terms of the struggle for resources and to improving the situation in the region; (3) the peace process was set in motion without a firm understanding that bridging peace between the warring parties was going to involve a great deal of resistance unless the agenda of the various parties were considered.

UNMIS 2006 Panel Report Recommendations

In resolution 1591 from March 2005, the Security Council requested that a Panel of Experts report on the causes that are impeding the peace process in the region and further monitoring efforts in Darfur. The 64-page report shares the Panel's findings on political and security developments, the monitoring efforts of the arms embargo, the regional and international customs and border control problems, and individuals who are impeding the peace process, with recommendations for improvements in each of these areas. The Panelists highlight that:

- there are still blatant violations of arms embargos;
- no compulsory disarmament of Janjaweed has occurred;
- that there are no customs checks at the border to prevent weapon and vehicle transfers;
- the government continues to use unmarked vehicles to transfer equipment and weapons to the Janjaweed;
- detention of civilians without explanation occurs without trials;
- that there has been no progress in providing an implementation mechanism for financial sanctions that were placed in connection with designated person;
- the National Redemption Front has taken on more of a momentum since the signing of the DPA;
- the Government still has a policy that non-signatories to the DPA are terrorists and should be crushed and Sudanese armed forces have attacked G19 and Jebel Moon rebel groups.

The Panel describes that in terms of political and security developments, there is still a widespread power struggle that is causing most of the violations and insecurity in the region. The Group of 19 that split from the SLM/A on the issue of signing the Darfur Peace Agreement has found justification in their attacks on civilians and currently non-signatories are facing a governmental policy of increased violence toward the factions that did not sign the DPA. The split between the factions has become worse since the DPA was introduced. The government has not taken any steps toward building trust with the factions or the displaced persons who also did not support the DPA. Participation of NGO's in Darfur is declining because of the insecurity in the region. The government of Sudan was supportive of the Panel in its work and an official traveled with the Panel to facilitate meetings with government officials, but did not allow the Panel to get a complete picture of the situation. The situation with the Special Courts and the disappointing outcomes of courts decisions is indicative of policy apathy. Reconciliation meetings sponsored by the Sudanese government have not been able to reach resolutions

on water and pasture disputes, as the legitimate leaders haven't been present at these meetings, while the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) has attempted to facilitate these meetings, without lasting success.

The situation as described by the panelists is that “factions are treating their respective territories as areas where their dictates are to be treated as the law of the land.” (p.20) The Panel had to remain neutral and the government has imposed a night curfew that has impeded the Panel's ability to monitor the arms embargo, since many of the violations take place at night.

The recommendations that the Panel makes are:

1. The Security Council should extend the duration of any future mandate of the Panel to a period of one year to ensure that the Panel has sufficient time to accomplish its tasks.
2. If the mandate is renewed, an addition of a professional investigator with a working knowledge of Arabic and an assistant conversant with the socio-political dynamics of the region, preferably a local person.
3. The Government of Sudan should grant multiple-entry visas to the Panel members until the end of the Mandate.
4. The Government of Sudan should exempt the Panel from restrictions of movement during the period of the curfew to provide security support.
5. In order to develop an arms inventory, a verification system should be put in place and can be achieved under the DPA.
6. Countries that conduct trade in military goods and services with the Sudan should implement a self-imposed requirement for end-use certification.

7. An in-depth assessment of the Customs and border control should be done.
8. A proactive approach toward facilitating identification of designated persons.
9. The UN should enter into an agreement with Interpol for alerts on designated persons.
10. Border agencies should not be the only ones receiving travel ban information, as airlines and related travel agencies could assist in the ban.

Additionally, the Panelists report on several case studies that illustrate the nature of the violations and attacks.

UNMIS 2007 Work Plan toward Development

A 2007 Work Plan, written by the UN in partnership with NGO's and others in the humanitarian community who are actively working toward humanitarian efforts in Sudan, reveals the ambitious plans to assist the growing crisis in Darfur. Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) will play a large role in the humanitarian efforts in the region in 2007. While the report discusses some of the reconstruction and development efforts, it also addresses one of the major concerns in Darfur: the difference between assumptions and the real situation that has unfolded. Much can be learned from the Sierra Leone mission in this regard.

One of the assumptions that it addresses is "those peace agreements formulated for Eastern Sudan and Darfur would result in improvements to security and to the delivery of humanitarian and recovery/development assistance." However, as the work plan states, the reality was that "while the DPA provided the foundation for increased stability in Darfur, it did not result in an improvement in security, nor did all parties to it, fully subscribe to the implementation of its terms. Additionally violations against the civilian population escalated in the aftermath of the signing of the DPA, while the situation on the ground remained highly volatile. In Darfur, deteriorating security meant

that the projected 30% rate of return did not materialize.” (p. 12)

Since the conditions for development have not existed, recovery plans seem hard to realize, based on the approach currently being used. Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) began in July of 2006 to identify early recovery and longer-term development and reconstruction needs. It is expected that the DJAM will be completed in 2007 when a functioning ceasefire and much greater acceptance and adherence to the Darfur peace process amongst the non-signatories to the DPA is achieved. Once these steps are concluded, recovery projects will be identified for inclusion in the Work Plan. (p. 35)

As it stands, the aim of the work plan will be humanitarian in nature. The plan for basic infrastructure and settlement development includes:

“The 2007 programmes will concentrate on strengthening the intra-regional transport sector. The sector plans to decrease transportation time and support transport of 50% more goods by road instead of by air. This will be achieved through emergency road repair (inclusive of that resulting from mine action) in Southern Sudan and an increase in the capacity of river-borne barge operations. Some 3,518 Km of roads will be rehabilitated or constructed, 44 bridges will be constructed and 15 airstrips will be repaired. Other plans include the rehabilitation of twelve markets, and construction of new classrooms, health facilities and community centres. Basic training and skills transference covering community management, leadership and participatory planning will be delivered to vulnerable communities.” (p. 36)

UNMIS Criticisms

- Would the situation be different if UNMIS had used its Chapter VII authority to undertake a serious disarmament mission to secure the region and wouldn't that have led to more diplomatic peace negotiations?
- Why weren't implications looked at of DPA's opponents prior to the signing of the treaty?
- Why didn't the local government take charge after the DPA was being enforced as in the case Rhodesia/Zimbabwe when the governor took control of enforcing the treaty as soon as the agreement was signed? This implies that there is no local government support in the agreement.
- Why is there not a stronger commitment of UN peacekeeping troops considering other peacekeeping missions that could not gain the consent of the host government in the face of genocide?

Lessons Learned - UNAMIR

UNAMIR lasted from October 1993 to March 1996 with the purpose of aiding in implementing the Arusha Accords to ease tensions between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi rebels. Although initially there seemed to be a commitment to the Arusha Accords, the formation of the transitional government caused much conflict between the parties. Formation of the transitional government was delayed and security deteriorated followed by the genocide, which included the deaths of key officials in UNAMIR. Belgian troops left and General Dallaire was denied more troops. His efforts for peace talks were without result. The right to use force was unclear.

What was learned in UNAMIR that might serve to improve the mission to Sudan? Several points can be stated, but Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke suggest that chief among them are: (1) the mission was contingent on local progress set on creating peace in the region rather than strengthening its force to support its diplomatic efforts; (2) the Arusha Accords were much broader in scope for protection of civilians and the size of the region to be secured than the UN mandate for UNAMIR; (3) when the Arusha Accords stalled and peace efforts developed greater violence as a reaction, the Security Council

showed how risk averse it was by not increasing its efforts in enforcing peace in the region with a deployment; and (4) the Security Council had no policy options in place and did not have an analysis of the implications of the roots of the conflict in the region or what spoilers to the peace process could do to impede efforts. As Phosa states, the UN tried to implement peace accords, one or more of the parties withdrew consent. (p. 10) Finally, the Security Council did not assert its role in maintaining a humanitarian impulse to prevent victimization in the first place as a result of the genocide.

In UNAMIR, there were reports of the intention of a well-armed and ruthless group to disrupt and derail the peace process. But the implications were not discussed with respect to UNAMIR's mandate and force. The US drafted a mandate that involved increasing UN troop size in Darfur, and wanted only a 3 month extension to keep pressure on Sudan toward accepting a UN hybrid force, but Security Council members insisted that it be 6 months and maintain 10,000. This last point seems to resemble the current situation the most, as the Security Council has shown by voting against a greater UN determination to strengthen the UN force.

Lessons Learned - UNAMSIL

UNAMSIL, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, was established in 1999 to cooperate with the government of Sierra Leone and other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement to end the 10-year civil war. UNAMSIL had the assistance of Nigerian peacekeeping troops ECOMOG. The regional leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was responsible for restoring peace in the region until the Secretary General authorized the UN to sponsor peace negotiations with ECOWAS. The slow deployment of UN troops into the area was exploited by the RUF (Revolutionary United Front), while ECOMOG reduced its troop size in 2000 and 50 UN troops were taken hostage. As noted by Krasno in her 2005 Public Opinion Study, a redeployment and strengthened effort helped release these hostages and currently there is a constitutional democracy in place. (p. 9)

UNAMSIL offers many suggestions that could serve in improving the UNMIS. A key weakness was Berhanu Dinka's nine month long mediation between the newly

elected Kabbah government and the RUF. Dinka's mediation brought about a blanket amnesty for the RUF, as well as a neutral monitoring group that would track breaches of the cease fire within the Abidjan Agreement. The Abidjan Agreement proved to be impossible to implement which led to a coup after which the RUF conducted massive violence on the civilians to demonstrate their strength.

John Hirsch also reinforces that the key strengths of this mission include: (1) special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Oluyemi Adeniji's key contributions after the hostage crisis that were accepted by the Security Council including a robust mandate and a two-track strategy that produced results; and (2) strong leadership from the P-5s and the strengthened commitment of more British and US force in disarming the RUF and the West Side Boys.

The major source of conflict in the area was the RUF's demand for power-sharing in the government and continued access to the country's economic resources, the diamond fields. Adeniji acknowledged the importance of continuing dialogue with the RUF while UNAMSIL continued to enhance enforcement. The strength of the two track strategy which linked the RUF's participation in disarmament and demobilization and a reintegration process with the opportunity to have them take part in the upcoming election proved successful. The results were notable, including: a cease-fire, cooperation through disarmament and demobilization, the opening of roads, and allowing humanitarian assistance to reach the Kailiahun residents. The stronger relations between the Security Council and regional actors at all phases of planning and implementation of the mission proved extremely effective. The immediate troop contributions by the UK and US after the hostage crisis made sure that the long term goal was not lost during the crisis.

Hirsch recommends designating development and reintegrating former combatants an integral part of a peacekeeping operation from the beginning. This recommendation could prove useful in Darfur, since the presence of UNAMIS is contingent on the acceptance of the peace agreement rather than stopping the victimization of civilians by warring groups that do not see what the promise of development and reconstruction could bring in lieu of chaos that can be exploited.

In the 2005 Public Opinion Survey of UNAMSIL's Work in Sierra Leone by Dr.

Jean Krasno, Sierra Leoneans found it particularly beneficial that UN peacekeepers built roads and bridges, road networks, shelters, health centers, radio stations, school, quality water wells, rehabilitation prisons, churches, and market structures. They also found the night patrols very useful. This built good will and trust with the local populations. In the area of human rights, raising awareness of human rights was extremely beneficial to locals and intervention on behalf of victims was positive. Sierra Leonians are very fearful of the August 2007 elections as a result of the 1996 elections and the dismembering that took place to prevent voter participation. Many participants in the study asked for UN assurances to monitor the elections. (p.7)

The main concern for Sierra Leoneans ,which is discussed in the Krasno survey, was that the examples of community development work were very appreciated as was the infrastructural work including road work, development projects and raising awareness of human rights that enabled people to strengthen their own capacities to be productive and return to normal lives (p. 29).

Other Lessons Learned

In 1997, Mathews Phosa, the premier of Mpumalanga province, who wrote of the challenges to peace support operations, noted that the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia effort also lends several good lessons. These might improve UNMIS. As soon as the Lancaster House agreements were signed, the system was handed over to the governor to maintain law and order. Improving relations with the local government in Darfur would improve the chances that security can be reached in the region and build trust. Secondly, the CMF went a long way towards gaining the trust of the guerrillas, which does not seem to be the case in Darfur. (p.5)

Conclusion and Recommendations

All the recommendations from the Panel Report seem justified and would better serve the UNMIS. In addition, no progress will be made without including leaders of factions in peace talks to understand their demands and to invigorate disarmament in exchange for participation in development efforts. The agendas of the warlords must be

understood and handled appropriately, while providing Darfur factions, like the Sierra Leonian RUF, participation in disarmament and demobilization and a reintegration process with the opportunity to have them take part in the upcoming election would prove successful. It appears that the DPA did more harm than good and the fact that the security and safety of the people in the region is contingent on failed peace talks and the results that occurred - and the lack of studies of the implications of this chain of events - reveals the gamble that has been taken in Sudan. Without the Sudanese government and the UN working to gain the trust of these factions, the region will continue to resemble more of a failed state.

Additionally, as found by Matthews Phosa through his analysis of training for peacekeeping missions, it does not serve the mission well when military peacekeepers have to act as negotiators and diplomats in the field. More effort should be made to have this important task undertaken by trained diplomats to facilitate and improve the interaction between warring parties. (p.16)

Finally, approaching the peace process in a holistic manner that takes into account the future needs of the society in the region in conflict must include disarmament as soon as possible, development efforts from the beginning, and the mission should be contingent on reasserting efforts rather than on incremental progress that may not be reached in the short term given the lack of inclusiveness that is the cause of the conflict. The security and safety within the region cannot be sacrificed when the implications of failed efforts are not part of the planning and operationalization of a peacekeeping mission.

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